Justice for all : inconvenient truths and reconciliation in human-non-human relations. by Strang,  V.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
26 January 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Strang, V. (2017) 'Justice for all : inconvenient truths and reconciliation in human-non-human relations.', in
Routledge handbook of environmental anthropology. London ; New York: Routledge, pp. 259-275. Routledge
international handbooks.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.routledge.com/9781138782877
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Routledge Handbook of Environmental
Anthropology on 12/08/2016, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138782877
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Handbook of Environmental Anthropology 
Revised (post editors comments)March 2015 
 
 
Justice for All: inconvenient truths and  
reconciliation in human-non-human relations 
 
Veronica Strang 
(Durham University) 
 
Professor Veronica Strang 
Executive Director 
Institute of Advanced Study  
Durham University 
Cosin's Hall  
Palace Green  
Durham  
DH1 3RL  
 
Tel: +44 (0)191 334 4684  
Fax: +44 (0)191 334 4699  
Email: veronica.strang@durham.ac.uk 
www.durham.ac.uk/ias 
  
2 
 
Justice for All: inconvenient truths and  
reconciliation in human-non-human relations 
 
Veronica Strang 
(Durham University) 
 
Abstract 
 
Anthropologists have long assisted disadvantaged human communities in their 
endeavours to achieve social justice, and they are now paying increasing attention to 
the need to extend notions of justice to non-human species. The emergence of more 
fluid and relational social theories, along with some useful experiments with 
interspecies ethnography, have served to promote bioethical approaches suggesting that 
justice for people should not – and indeed cannot – come before ecological justice. 
Animal rights debates have continued to raise moral questions about the provision of 
justice to those who cannot speak for themselves. Environmental concerns have 
foregrounded the interdependence of humans and other species and the potential for the 
disruption of these relationships to have major impacts on whole ecosystems. And, with 
extinction rates rocketing, it is clear that a dualistic vision of Culture and Nature that 
produces separate ‘social’ and ‘environmental’ categories is both theoretically and 
practically inadequate. This chapter therefore seeks to articulate a theoretical approach 
that reconciles the human and non-human, and underlines the reality that sustainable 
relationships between them can only be achieved by the provision of justice for all.  
 
 
 
Justice and Equity 
 
Why should anthropology, a discipline focused on understanding human beings, consider 
those that are non-human? Is that not the role of zoologists and biologists, or our closer 
cousins, the primatologists? And why should we extend notions of justice to non-human 
kinds when, in some instances, this may only be achieved by sacrificing the immediate 
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interests of the disadvantaged human groups for whom we have traditionally acted as 
advocates?  
 
< FIG. 1. HERE> 
 
Fig. 1. Orangutan, Singapore Zoo. Photo by author.  
 
This chapter suggests that a concern for the non-human should be encompassed by 
anthropologists for reasons that are ethical, practical, and intellectual. First, the notion of 
justice is fundamentally concerned with equalising relations between those who have power 
and those who do not. This raises a moral question about the provision of justice to those who 
can speak for themselves, in preference to those who cannot. Second, humans, other species 
and the material world are bound together in communal processes of production and 
reproduction that are interdependent, such that disruption for any of the participants has 
potentially major impacts on the others. A short-term focus on immediate human interests has 
longer-term detrimental effects on humans and non-humans alike. Third, the dualistic vision 
of Culture and Nature, which underpins the putatively separate categories of ‘social’ and 
‘environmental’, is theoretically inadequate, and theory is manifested in practice. A 
theoretical frame in which human needs and interests are separated and prioritised inevitably 
gives insufficient weight to the needs of the non-human.  
 
A more theoretically robust approach would recognise the artificiality of such dualism, 
reintegrate the human and non-human, and thus enable reconciliation between the critical 
perspectives on these issues. In sum: giving humankind priority in the provision of justice 
leads down a path that is morally questionable, carries high risks, and is intellectually 
problematic. What is needed, instead, is the simultaneous provision of justice for all human 
and non-human beings. Thus, in defining a theory of ecological justice, Baxter argues that 
non-human species have a moral right to distributive justice, which entails ‘recognizing their 
claim to a fair share of the environmental resources which all life-forms need to survive and 
to flourish’ (2005: 4).  
 
The concept of justice is fundamentally ideological. It was first used in English in the 
medieval period to express the idea that the ‘right order’ of things involved some degree of 
equity (Hunt 2009). It therefore implies collaborative rather than competitive relationships. A 
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later usage, from the 17
th
 century, ‘to do justice to’ contained the slightly broader meaning: 
that justice means ‘to render fully and fairly, showing due appreciation’ (Harper 2014: 1). 
Justice is therefore underpinned by an idea that maintaining a proper order in the world 
involves ‘appreciating’: recognising and upholding the value of others. With the emphasis on 
‘others’, it seems both categorically and ethically questionable to confine notions of justice, 
equity and value to relationships between humans. 
 
< FIG. 2. HERE> 
 
Fig. 2. Mustering cattle in Cape York. Photo by author.  
 
Prioritising justice as a means of ensuring equity leads directly to issues of power and agency. 
In the last few centuries, large industrialised societies have embarked upon hegemonic 
colonial enterprises, creating wildly unequal power relations between and within human 
societies. In many cases relatively egalitarian indigenous forms of social organisation have 
been subsumed by hierarchical and patriarchal forms of governance in which indigenous 
communities, minorities, and women, have been relegated to second and sometimes third-
class citizenship, assuming they even achieve the latter. For example: in European nations 
women generally only achieved full suffrage after 1900 and in some cases not until the 
second half of the century.
1
 Aboriginal Australians were not given Australian citizenship 
until 1967 (Attwood and Marcus 1999, Howard 2003). 
 
Anthropological interests in justice have therefore tended to focus on the social and economic 
rights of disadvantaged human groups. As well as articulating ideas about citizenship and 
enfranchisement, these interests are often entangled with promoting ‘development’ and more 
equitable access to resources. Much work has been done on the ownership of property and 
resources, highlighting the inequities generated by globalisation and the neo-colonial 
economic expansion of transnational corporations (Anderson and Berglund 2003, Paavola 
and Lowe 2005, Strang and Busse 2011, Strang 2009a).  
 
Sometimes obscured in these debates is the reality that both the early colonial and the recent 
hegemonies of the global ‘market’ have exported to all corners of the globe highly 
unsustainable economic practices (Franklin 2006, Griffiths and Robin 1997). Their defining 
characteristic is ever-greater instrumentalism in human engagements with the material world 
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and its non-human inhabitants. Though acknowledging its deep historical roots, Horkheimer 
and Adorno (2002) suggest that this became firmly established in the post-Enlightenment 
period, when through ‘rational sovereignty’, humankind achieved the ‘mastery’ of Nature, 
manifested in the all-consuming engine of an ever-expanding capitalist economy. Illich 
(1999) is similarly critical of obsessions with growth and the ‘Promethean transgression’ 
represented by the abandonment of sustainable ‘balance and limits’ in favour of 
development’s constant expectation of ‘more’(1999: 14). Moran (2006) notes that ‘addictive’ 
patterns of consumption became particularly aspirational in the post-war era. In this period 
technological advances enabled particularly rapid intensifications in the use of land and water 
resources, and commensurately detrimental impacts on non-human species and ecosystems. 
Thus economic growth has been achieved – and continues to be achieved – via the 
externalisation of multiple costs to less powerful human and non-human communities 
(Johnston et al 2012, Moran 2006, Plumwood 2002). 
 
With the most powerful societies living in unsustainable affluence, it is difficult to suggest 
that other people should be prevented from enjoying the material benefits that industrialised 
economic practices allow. Discourses on justice often imply that the most disadvantaged 
human groups should have special rights to redress long-term imbalances, and clearly there is 
a case to be made. However, if the result is only a short-term gain at the long-term expense of 
the non-human (and thus humans too), this is not a sustainable way to achieve either social or 
ecological equity. Special rights to resources, like other forms of positive discrimination, tend 
to reify disparities in power as much as they address them. And there remains a thorny moral 
question as to whether anyone, advantaged or disadvantaged, has the right to prioritise their 
own interests to the extent that those of the non-human are deemed expendable. 
 
< FIG. 3. HERE> 
 
Fig. 3. Wallabies are an important traditional bush food for Aboriginal communities in 
Australia. Photo by author. 
 
An ethnographic example from my own fieldwork illustrates this dilemma. Should 
Aboriginal communities in Australia have the ‘right’ to adapt their traditional practices to 
shoot rather than spear wallabies, to the point that the once plentiful population of wallabies 
in Cape York has dwindled to critical levels? The complexities of the issue surfaced at a 
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meeting between Aboriginal elders and representatives of the Queensland National Parks 
service, while legislation was being tabled to prevent hunting in Australia’s national parks. 
One of the elders, Colin Lawrence, referred to the history of settlement in the area. In the 
early 1900s, a European grazier had shot a number of Aboriginal people until being speared 
by one of their leaders, now regarded as a local hero. The grazier had shot Aboriginal people 
‘like dogs’, said Lawrence pointedly, ‘and now you want to tell us we can’t even shoot a 
wallaby!’ (Strang, field notes 1991).   
 
Yet the number of wallabies has fallen dramatically, not just because the possession of cars 
and rifles has enabled new forms of hunting, but also because of the competition for food 
within a fragile habitat created by intensifying cattle farming. At some point, the population 
may drop to unviable levels. Should this be an Aboriginal choice? Should it be anyone’s 
choice? This opens up a question about justice and cultural relativity, and whether 
anthropologists should promote cultural relativity to the degree that no universal human – or 
other – rights carry any weight. In anthropological debates about ethics (Caplan 2003), some 
of us have argued that extreme cultural relativity, in which it is possible to ignore major 
abuses of human rights (such as domestic violence), is an abdication of moral responsibility. 
If we extend this to non-human rights, then one might say precisely the same thing.  
 
<FIG. 4. HERE> 
 
Fig. 4. Bull catching in Cape York. Photo by author. 
 
This implies that we all share a moral responsibility to prevent abuse of the non-human as 
well as the human. Though there is wide cultural and sub-cultural diversity in what people 
consider to be abuse (for example the range between promoting the humane slaughter and 
eating of animals and extreme veganism), many indigenous communities would probably 
agree. Aboriginal Australian and Maori ideologies certainly valorise respect for and 
collaboration with the non-human, and I will come back to this point. Many anthropologists 
are – in my view quite rightly – concerned with disempowered human groups and advocates 
for their rights. But perhaps, in engaging in these issues, it is important not to separate people 
from the non-human and from the larger world that we all inhabit. 
 
Casualties 
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Abstract concepts of environmental and ecological justice tend to subsume the reality that 
‘the environment’ and its ecosystems are composed of thousands of individual species, 
ranging from the smallest microbial organisms (vital to healthy soil and to aquatic balance), 
to the largest creatures such as whales and elephants, which tend to get most of the public 
press about animal rights. But human destruction is undiscriminating: according to the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the UN Environmental Programme, 
the effects of the Anthropocene – that is the period of human history since the Holocene – 
have been increasingly disastrous for most of the non-human inhabitants of the planet.  
 
The list of causal factors is long, but includes extensive deforestation; the burning of fossil 
fuels and the production of CO2 (leading to the melting of glaciers and arctic ice, and thus the 
loss of freshwater resources and rising sea levels); the overuse of fertilisers, herbicides and 
pesticides; pollution from multiple forms of mining and manufacturing. Overall, there have 
been massive diversions of freshwater and other resources into human processes of 
production and consumption, and competition for these resources has produced millions of 
(human) refugees: 
 
The exponential increase in all of these measurable phenomena is tied most 
fundamentally to two factors: the increase in the human population and our 
consumption habits. Indeed one must think of these two factors in tandem. (Moran 
2006: 2-3) 
 
What I want to underline here, though, is that this competition is not just between humans: all 
of these activities have entailed the loss of habitats and resources for non-human beings and, 
with depressing frequency, their demise. Throughout the Anthropocene, and in particular 
over the last 500 years, there has been an exponential acceleration in the rate of species 
extinction, even taking into account previous peaks caused by major environmental events, 
such as volcanic eruptions. The IUCN calculates that humankind has now anthropogenically 
increased ‘normal’ rates of extinction by about 10,000 per cent. Within the next 40-50 years 
the coral reefs, on which about one quarter of the oceans’ species depend, will have 
disappeared. About 25% of the mammals on this planet will be extinct, as will about 41% of 
its amphibians. Thousands of species, large and small, will have been sacrificed to human 
societies’ endeavours to achieve the continual ‘growth’ and ‘development’ that requires 
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constant intensification in the use of ‘our’ resources. In all senses of the term, how can this be 
justified? 
 
< FIG. 5. HERE> 
 
Fig. 5. Seal pup, Kangeroo Island, South Australia. Photo by author. 
 
Even if a justification could be made, this is a critically short-term mode of environmental 
engagement, echoing on a planetary scale the dynamics that have already caused more 
localised forms of societal collapse (Caldararo 2004, Diamond 2005). As Dobson points out 
(1998) the self-interested argument that the non-human should be protected because it is 
essential to human societies (as encapsulated in the Brundtland Report of 1987) is not 
sufficient in itself. But there is no doubt that it has become more pressing. The physical 
interdependences between humankind and other species are fundamental and complex. As 
much interdisciplinary work has shown, complex adaptive systems can be sensitive to 
relatively minor social and/or ecological events (Holland 2001, Lansing 2003). Ecosystemic 
integrity or resilience – what Moran calls ‘the web of life’ – relies on biodiversity and, it has 
been argued, cultural diversity too (Moran 2006, Posey and Plenderleith 2004, Orlove and 
Brush 1996).  
 
Little ecological expertise is required to see that removing multiple participants in such a 
complex array of interdependent relationships is not a viable long-term option.  
Approximately 500 million people depend on the aquatic resources supported by the coral 
reefs currently being destroyed by the impacts of unsustainable energy use. About three-
quarters of the crops planted by humans are pollinated by bees, and these crops comprise 
about a third of the world’s food. In the UK, recent controversies have drawn attention to the 
use of neonicotinoids to control crop pests, and their potential to endanger bee populations, 
and yet their use continues. Prioritising the rights of manufacturers or farmers to make short-
term profits at the expense of the non-human is likely to become very expensive for humans 
themselves. The growing number of environmental refugees around the world, and the human 
populations suffering in conflicts over resources, are only the first tranche of casualties in a 
combative engagement with ‘the other’ that, if it were aimed directly towards human groups, 
we would have no difficulty in recognising as a war.  
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Reconciling the Other 
 
It is of course the non-humanity, the ‘otherness’ of non-human species that gives license to 
their destruction, just as it does when fellow humans are ‘de-humanised’. Categorised firmly 
as ‘other’, non-human beings can be domesticated and enslaved; actively destroyed if 
troublesome; or merely extinguished by a disregard for their interests. They can be consumed 
as food, killed for sport, or used to provide resources such as leather, fertiliser and oil. Such 
usage only becomes problematic when they acquire anthropomorphic personhood as pets and 
companions: a categorical repositioning which may gain them much pampering and affection  
–  at least until they become elderly and commit the capital crime of incontinence.  
 
< FIG. 6. HERE> 
 
Fig. 6. Horsebreaking in North Queensland. Photo by author.  
 
There is, of course, a rich anthropological literature on the complex and diverse relations 
between humans and animals, addressing long-term issues of domestication (Clutton-Brock 
1988, Crosby 1994, Ellen and Fukui 1996) and examining categorical distinctions (Atran 
1990, Bulmer 1967, Douglas 1973, Durkheim and Mauss 1963, Willis 1989). There is also 
close interest in the various ways in which animals become persons, as totemic ancestors 
(Durkheim 1961); as the medieval perpetrators of crimes (Phillips 2013)
2
; as pets (Manning 
and Serpell 1994, Serpell 1996) and as what conservation organisations describe as ‘iconic’ 
species (Milton 1993, 2003). All depend on some acknowledgement of animals as persons 
(Carrithers et al 2011, Fuentes and Wolfe 2002, Knight 2005, Noske 1989, 1997, Ritvo 
1987).  
 
This literature illustrates the myriad entanglements of human and non-human lives, and the 
often symbiotic interdependencies that these create. However, although it highlights the 
contingency of ideas about personhood, and its potential to be extended beyond human 
boundaries, it tends generally to retain a vision of personhood as human. Animals acquire 
personhood by becoming anthropomorphised, by being perceived as having human 
characteristics, emotions or behaviours, or by being encompassed by individual or collective 
constructions of human identity. In large-scale industrialised societies at least, this does not 
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imply an alternate, non-human form of personhood, or challenge more fundamental 
distinctions between human and other.  
 
It is useful to relocate this categorical separation in its historical context. Moran suggests that:  
 
The nature-culture dichotomy has been central to Western thinking since time 
immemorial… Dichotomous thinking led us to think of people as apart from nature, 
and charged with controlling nature for human purposes – and crucially, as distinct 
from the inherent dynamics of the Earth system itself. (2006: 7-8) 
 
One might question the ‘since time immemorial’, but Nature-Culture dualism has certainly 
been a dominant model for a long time. Following Durkheim (1961), it may be said to have 
followed a (putatively) progressive trajectory away from ‘nature religions’ valorising non-
human deities; towards religions worshipping humanised gods; into increasingly patriarchal 
and hierarchical monotheisms and scientific deconstructions of the world (Harrison 1999, 
Hocart 1970, Strang 2014a). A dualistic vision of (supposedly rational, male) Culture and 
(primal, feminised) Nature introduced not only a critical separation between them, but also 
encouraged widening inequities in their perceived power and status – inequities that continue 
to be reflected in their differential access to justice (Adams 1993, Ortner 1976, Plumwood 
1993, 2002).  
 
Nature-Culture dualism has been so normalised over time that it has become seemingly 
fundamental in everyday discourses and in many areas of ‘natural’ science. However, 
theorists such as Strathern (1992), Verdery and Humphrey (2004), Escobar 1999, and 
Descola and Palsson (1996) have questioned its intellectual validity. In this area, as in others, 
anthropological theories have gained from engagement with diverse cultural ways of 
understanding the world.
3
 A sharply dualistic vision of Nature and Culture, or for that matter 
human and non-human, does not pertain in all societies’ worldviews, and is notably absent in 
many indigenous cosmologies (Greenough and Lowenhaupt-Tsing 2003). This has real 
implications for the environmental values that they promote, and for the relationships with 
the non-human that they compose, encouraging more egalitarian and reciprocal approaches 
that are – demonstrably – more sustainable in the longer term (Moran 2006, Strang 1997). 
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Such statements tend to attract the ire of conservative writers, anxious about the 
romanticisation of indigenous peoples’ relationships with their environments. But it is 
necessary to put aside the historical imagery about Noble Savages, as well as the popular 
representations of indigenous ‘harmony with nature’ utilised by conservation organisations 
and sometimes (with astute political aims) by indigenous groups themselves (Ellen 1986, 
Hames 2007). There are real differences to consider in the ways that some indigenous groups 
conceptualise human and other beings. For example, Aboriginal Australian understandings 
about what it means to be human, and how human and other beings interconnect, are 
unencumbered by dualistic siloes. These differences are revealed in their ideas about the fluid 
movement of the human spirit over space and time, into and out of material being, via various 
human and non-human forms. The human spirit’s generation from ancestral forces held in the 
land; its corporate manifestation as a human person; and its eventual reunification with, or 
dissolution into, an invisible totemic (non-human) ancestral being, highlight a cultural 
understanding in which human-ness is seen as ‘contingent matter’ (Strang 2002, 2009b, 
2014b,).  
 
On the Matter of Being 
 
While issues of materiality may seem tangential to the attainment of ecological justice, the 
emergent literature in this area emphasises the fact that matter matters. Humans are bio-
cultural beings, sharing huge amounts of genetic material with other organic species, and 
subject to the same evolutionary and biological processes (Ingold and Palsson 2013). We 
depend absolutely upon complex interrelationships not only between ourselves and non-
human beings, but also with ecological processes and the range of organic and inorganic 
materials that constitute these. For instance, every cell in the human body is irrigated by 
water; the human body is about 67% water; even our thoughts depend upon the electric 
charges enabled by water molecules. We may sit at the top of the food chain (until arriving 
eventually at the bottom of it), but we are still dynamically composed – and decomposed – of 
the material of the world. 
 
Foregrounding materiality enables us to reconsider ecological justice in several ways. First, it 
conceptually relocates humankind firmly within the material interdependencies that compose 
ecology. A useful impetus to these ideas has been provided by network theories and STS 
approaches, which question and perceptually dissolve the boundaries of relationality in 
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human and non-human interactions (Latour 2005, Mol and Law 1994, Mol 2002). Materialist 
thinking has been taken further by writers such as Bennett (2009), Tsing (2004) and Ingold 
(2012) who have elucidated the dynamism of the ‘vibrant matter’, ‘friction’ and ‘flux’ 
through which the ‘matter of being’ emerges in spatio-temporal processes of ‘becoming’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1993). Coole and Frost argue that these ‘vitalist’ approaches require a 
new materialist ontology which is post rather than anti-Cartesian, and which ‘avoids dualism 
or dialectical reconciliation by espousing a monological account of emergent, generative 
material being’ (2010: 8). Examining human-non-human relationships from this perspective 
therefore presents a direct challenge to a dualistic vision of Nature and Culture, and opens up 
new opportunities to rethink its positionalities.  
 
Such reconsideration has generated humbler, more bioethical – ie. biocentric – approaches in 
which humans no longer automatically hold the centre stage (Chen et al 2013, Haraway 2008, 
Tsing 2004).
4
 Related forays into ‘multispecies ethnography’ (eg. Kirksey and Helmreich 
2010, Tsing 2015) have provided insights into how human-non-human interactions affect a 
diverse range of ‘others’ including plants (Head and Atchison 2009), microbes (Helmreich 
2009), viruses (Lowe 2010) and corals (Hayward 2010), as well as those, such as primates, 
that are more easily seen in – literal – relation to humankind (Fuentes 2010). The ‘thought 
experiment’ of considering their emic perspectives provides fresh ideas about personhood, 
and thus issues of ecological justice, establishing a vision of multiple forms of participants 
and persons in human-environmental relations.  
 
 
< FIG. 7. HERE> 
 
Fig. 7. Stockman with pet dingo pup. Photo by author.  
 
A quite different approach is provided by specialists in material culture, and this too seems 
unrelated to issues of ecological justice until we consider its capacity to highlight the agency 
of things. There is no space here to engage with lengthy debates about material agency (e.g. 
Ingold 2007, Knappett and Malafouris 2008, Strang 2015), but I want to highlight the value 
of starting with a question about ‘what things do’. Like studies of human-animal relations, 
those concerned with material things have benefited from exchanges of knowledge about 
indigenous lifeworlds containing sentient landscapes and objects, providing – again – highly 
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fluid ideas about personhood, agency and identity. While it is obviously critical to separate 
contemporary theories of materiality from traditional beliefs in animism, the capacity of the 
latter to imagine an active material world has proved fruitful. Research on how things and 
persons act upon each other (Gell 1998, Tilley et al 2006) is now extending usefully into a 
consideration of how, via their particular properties and behaviours, aspects of the material 
environment – including its ‘resources’ – play an agentive, recursive role in human-non-
human engagements (Bakker and Bridge 2006, Boivin 2008, Strang 2014b).  
 
Rather than being constituted anthropocentrically, as merely the passive subject of human 
action, this provides a more dynamically reciprocal view of the non-human material 
environment.  As with non-human species, this repositioning reframes it as an active 
participant in a mutually constitutive relational process, thus enabling an ‘appreciation of the 
other’ and highlighting the need to consider its interests. In this sense, it adds to the case for 
the extension of justice to encompass the non-human.  
 
<FIG. 8. HERE> 
 
Fig. 8. Author with favourite work horse. Photo by Clare Blackman.   
 
Justice for All 
 
The issue of value or ‘appreciation’ underpins each part of a rationale for the extension of 
notions of justice beyond humankind. Destructive modes of human-non-human engagement 
are enabled by a dualistic understanding of Culture and Nature which permits the devaluation 
of non-human beings, casting them as exploitable and expendable economic subjects. The 
alienation of ‘the other’ at a fundamental level also encourages human societies to make 
dangerously short-term choices while determinedly refusing to consider the ‘inconvenient 
truths’ of their likely consequences (Guggenheim 2006).  
 
As noted previously, there is a rational case to be made, on self-interest alone, for humankind 
to deal more reciprocally with other species and the material environment. The World 
Commission on Environment and Development, the IUCN, Greenpeace and other 
environmental organisations have made just such a case, as have the alarming scenarios 
presented by climate change scientists. Another approach purportedly aimed at conservation, 
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and self-defined as ‘rational’, is an all-pervasive push to commoditize ‘ecosystem services’ or 
‘environmental services’ by attached monetary value to all of the elements and processes of 
ecosystems according to the extent that they serve humankind.  
 
Jonathan Porritt argues that such marketization has been genuinely effective in persuading 
governments and industry to adjust their activities to conserve non-human species and the 
material environment. He suggests that framing human-environmental relationships in this 
way is the only realistic way to achieve these changes (pers. comm). He may well be right – 
his extraordinary track record means that he is better qualified to say this than just about 
anyone. But, as he also acknowledges, there remains a major question as to whether an 
approach that evaluates the non-human in reductive monetary terms (which inevitably 
excludes many unmeasurable factors), and which positions the environment and its non-
human inhabitants as a ‘service’ to humankind, can ever deliver the level of reciprocity 
required to ensure that non-human interests are protected in the longer term.
5
 My own view – 
because theoretical models inevitably manifest themselves in practice – is that an approach 
that places humankind in such a position of primacy, and which further entrenches the 
conceptual alienation between human and non-human, contains an inherent contradiction in 
terms of reciprocal relations, and will inevitably give priority to human interests ‘when push 
comes to shove’.  
 
And the problem is that push comes to shove all the time. Protecting ‘ecosystem services’, 
may work when there is the luxury of flexibility, but it is readily subsumed by more 
immediate pressures. It is plain that rationality rarely outweighs people’s capacities for 
denial. This is amply illustrated by most societies’ unaltered commitment to growth-based 
economic modes and their collective ineptness is reducing CO2 emissions. And there is an 
additional ethical question, which returns us to the issue of justice, as to whether, in any case, 
humankind has the right to impose on non-human species its own evaluation of their fiscal 
worth in terms of ‘service’.   
 
Deep ecologists have argued that real changes in practice are more likely to come, not from 
purportedly rational arguments about cause and effect, but from fundamental changes in 
values. For some writers this is a spiritual matter: Sponsel suggests that ‘spiritual ecology’ is 
needed to ‘tear many of our societies away from the forces of materialism which distort our 
values’ (2000: 95). Atran and Norenzayan (2004) argue that religion needs to challenge 
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science and secularism if humankind is to break away from self-interest and re-establish 
‘organic solidarity’. 
 
Given the Durkheimian contradictions to this vision of equality contained in most major 
religions, and their historic contribution to dualistic and unequal relationships with the non-
human, I am dubious about the utility of looking to religion in this endeavour. But, whether 
religious or secular, a shift in values is key: any sustainable way forward requires a 
‘rendering of justice to’ and ‘due appreciation’ of the non-human. Clearly a large-scale return 
to the kinds of pre-Christian ‘nature religions’ that valorised and appreciated the non-human 
is unlikely, but there is some potential to learn from those that pertain in indigenous 
communities. As noted above, indigenous worldviews in Australia and elsewhere generally 
construct relationships with other species and things that are more egalitarian and reciprocal, 
and more based on notions of partnership, thus ensuring ‘due appreciation’ for the non-
human.  
 
However, appreciation, co-identification and affective ties are not enough; deep ecology, or 
as Milton puts it ‘loving nature’ (2002) are not enough. What is most important about 
alternate worldviews is that they offer a genuinely different constellation of relations: a 
closely integrated model of human and non-human beings interacting within a single 
conceptual community. My concluding point, then, is that this provides exemplars about what 
is needed theoretically for long-term sustainability: a radical reconceptualisation of human-
non-human relationships and the notion of ‘community’ itself.  
 
This suggests that there is a need to incorporate into social anthropology the theorizations of 
writers interested in the bioethics of non-human and material worlds. These enable the 
repositioning of humankind and the inclusion of all species and materials as collaborative 
partners within a shared ‘monological’ process of becoming (Coole and Frost 2010). In these 
more inclusive visions, the idea of community can be ‘re-imagined’ to encompass the non-
human (Strang in press). In these terms, ‘justice for all’ is neither ‘social’ nor ‘ecological’, 
but is both conceptually and practically reconciled into a single vision of equity and order.  
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1
 Greece 1952, Switzerland 1971, Liechtenstein 1984. 
2
 It is clear that animals were regarded as having sufficient ‘personhood’ in medieval Europe to be subjected to 
human forms of justice and punishment in the famous animal trials of that period (Phillips 2013).  
3
 As I have noted elsewhere, anthropologicial theories have been co-constituted by ethnographic involvement 
and knowledge exchanges with multiple cultural perspectives (Strang 2006). 
4
 These resonate with longer-running debates about biocentric versus anthropocentric human-environmental 
relationships, or ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecology (Moran 2006). 
5
 Porritt notes the example provided by the Yasuni National Park in Ecuador, where efforts have been made to 
persuade the international community to pay to prevent the exploitation of rich oil reserves in a region critical 
for biodiversity. A tentative agreement has been reached, but the story is far from over. The list of less positive 
examples where conservation has been overridden by short-term efforts to extract resources or generate energe, 
is vastly longer, including for example, the tar sand oil extractions in Canada; the Three Gorges dams in China 
and myriad other instances where pressing economic needs or desires have subsumed all non-human interests.  
